Abstract. We propose new and improved instantiations of lossy trapdoor functions (Peikert and Waters in STOC'08, pp. 187-196, 2008), and correlation-secure trapdoor functions (Rosen and Segev in TCC'09, LNCS, vol. 5444, pp. 419-436, 2009). Our constructions widen the set of number-theoretic assumptions upon which these primitives can be based, and are summarized as follows:
Introduction
In this paper we describe new constructions of lossy trapdoor functions and correlationsecure trapdoor functions. These primitives are strengthened variants of the classical notion of trapdoor functions, and were introduced with the main goal of enabling simple and black-box constructions of public-key encryption schemes that are secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks. At a high level, they are defined as follows. [37] : A collection of lossy trapdoor functions consists of two families of functions. Functions in one family are injective and can be efficiently inverted using a trapdoor. Functions in the other family are "lossy," which means that the size of their image is significantly smaller than the size of their domain. The only security requirement is that a description of a randomly chosen function from the family of injective functions is computationally indistinguishable from a description of a randomly chosen function from the family of lossy functions. Correlation-secure trapdoor functions [39] : The classical notion of a one-way function asks for a function that is efficiently computable but is hard to invert given the image of a uniformly chosen input. Correlation security generalizes the one-wayness requirement by considering k-wise products of functions and any specified input distribution, not necessarily the uniform distribution. Given a collection of functions F and a distribution C over k-tuples of inputs, we say that F is secure under Ccorrelated inputs if the function (f 1 (x 1 ), . . . , f k (x k )) is one-way, where f 1 , . . . , f k are independently chosen from F and (x 1 , . . . , x k ) are sampled from C.
Lossy trapdoor functions
Lossy trapdoor functions were introduced by Peikert and Waters [37] , who showed that they imply fundamental cryptographic primitives such as trapdoor functions, collisionresistant hash functions, oblivious transfer, and CCA-secure public-key encryption. In addition, lossy trapdoor functions have already found various other applications, including deterministic public-key encryption [5] , OAEP-based public-key encryption [27] , "hedged" public-key encryption for protecting against bad randomness [1] , security against selective opening attacks [2] , and efficient non-interactive string commitments [34] . The notion of correlation security was introduced by Rosen and Segev [39] , who showed that any collection of injective trapdoor functions that is one-way under a natural input distribution can be used to construct a CCA-secure public-key encryption scheme. 1 They showed that any collection of lossy trapdoor functions that are sufficiently lossy is in fact also correlation-secure. This result was recently refined by Mol and Yilek [30] who showed that even lossiness of any polynomial fraction of a single bit suffices.
These applications motivate us to investigate new constructions of lossy and correlation-secure functions. Such constructions would enable us to widen the basis upon which one can achieve the above cryptographic tasks in a simple and modular way.
Our Contributions
We propose new and improved constructions of lossy and correlation-secure trapdoor functions based on well-established number-theoretic assumptions, some of which were previously not known to imply either of the primitives. By directly applying the results of [30, 37, 39] , we obtain new CCA-secure public-key encryption schemes based on these assumptions. Concretely, we present the following constructions (summarized in Table 1 ):
1. Lossy trapdoor permutations based on the quadratic residuosity assumption. Our construction relies on Rabin's modular squaring function and is based solely on the quadratic residuosity assumption. More precisely, the function is defined as f (x) = x 2 · δ r,s (x) mod N , where N = P Q is an RSA modulus and δ r,s (·) is a function indexed by two public elements r, s ∈ Z N serving two independent purposes. First, it extends the modular squaring function to a permutation over Z N . Second, it causes the function f (x) to lose the information about the sign of x if and only if s is a quadratic residue. Therefore, under the quadratic residuosity assumption f has one bit of lossiness. We note that although a function with only one bit of lossiness (or, more generally, with only a non-negligible amount of lossiness) is not necessarily a (strong) one-way function, it nevertheless can be used as a building block for constructing a CCA-secure public-key encryption scheme (see [30, 39] ). In addition, we describe a generalization of the construction to higher-order power residues that allows for more lossiness. 2. Lossy trapdoor functions based on the composite residuosity assumption. Our construction is based on the Damgård-Jurik encryption scheme [14] with additional insights by Damgård and Nielsen [15, 16] . The Damgård-Jurik scheme is based on computations in the group Z N s+1 , where N = P Q is an RSA modulus and s ≥ 1 is an integer (it contains Paillier's encryption scheme [35] as a special case by setting s = 1). At a high level, each function is described by a pair (pk, c), where pk is a public key for the encryption scheme, and c is either an encryption of 1 (injective mode) or an encryption of 0 (lossy mode). By using the homomorphic properties of the encryption scheme, given such a ciphertext c and an element x, it is possible to compute either an encryption of x in the injective mode, or an encryption of 0 in the lossy mode. We note that this construction was concurrently and independently proposed by Boldyreva et al. [5] . We also give an "all-but-one" version of the construction. 3 . Lossy trapdoor functions based on the d-Linear assumption. Our construction both simplifies and generalizes the DDH-based construction of Peikert and Waters [37, Sect. 5] . (Recall that DDH is the 1-Linear assumption.) Let G be a finite group of order p and choose an n × n matrix M over F p that has either rank d (lossy mode) or rank n (injective mode). We "encrypt" M = (a ij ) as the matrix g M = (g a ij ) ∈ G n×n , where g is a generator of G. If x is a binary vector of length n, then given g M we can efficiently evaluate the function f M ( x) = g M x ∈ G n . If M has rank n, then given M we can efficiently invert f M on the image of {0, 1} n . On the other hand, if M has rank d and p < 2 n/d , then f is lossy. The d-Linear assumption implies that the lossy and injective modes cannot be efficiently distinguished. We also give an "all-but-one" version of the construction based on the DDH assumption. 4. Correlation-secure trapdoor functions based on the hardness of syndrome de- coding. Our construction is based on Niederreiter's coding-based encryption system [33] which itself is the dual of the McEliece encryption system [29] . Our trapdoor function is defined as f (x) = H x, where H is a binary (n − k) × n matrix (from a certain distribution that allows for embedding a trapdoor) and x is bit string of small Hamming weight. We show that the function's correlation security is directly implied by a result of Fischer and Stern [18] about the pseudorandomness of the function f . Interestingly, the related McEliece trapdoor function (which can be viewed as the dual of the Niederreiter function) is not correlationsecure. 2 It is, however, possible to extend the framework of correlation security in a natural way to obtain a direct construction of a CCA-secure encryption scheme from the McEliece trapdoor function. This was recently demonstrated by Dowsley et al. [17] (who proposed the first coding-based encryption scheme that is CCAsecure in the standard model) and, for the related lattice case, independently by Peikert [36] and Goldwasser and Vaikuntanathan [20] . Our contribution is to show that the Niederreiter function admits a simple construction of correlation-secure trapdoor functions based on the same security assumptions as [17] . 3 The resulting CCA-secure encryption scheme is as efficient as the one from [17] . 2 The McEliece trapdoor function is defined as f H (x, e) := H x ⊕ e, where H is a binary k × n matrix,
x is a k-bit string and e is a error vector of small Hamming weight. Given H 1 , H 2 and two evaluations y 1 = H 1 x ⊕ e and y 2 = H 2 x ⊕ e one can reconstruct the unique x by solving (H 1 ⊕ H 2 )x = y 1 ⊕ y 2 for x. 3 We remark that our construction of a correlation-secure trapdoor function from coding theory does not carry over to the lattice case since the "dual" of the one-way function used in [20, 36] is not injective.
Related Work
Most of the known constructions and applications of lossy and correlation-secure trapdoor functions are already mentioned above; here we include a few more. Besides their construction based on DDH, Peikert and Waters [37] also present a construction of lossy trapdoor functions based on the worst-case hardness of lattice problems. The construction does not enjoy the same amount of lossiness as their DDH-based one, but it still suffices for their construction of a CCA-secure public-key encryption scheme. The worst-case hardness of lattice problems is also used by Peikert [36] and by Goldwasser and Vaikuntanathan [20] to construct CCA-secure encryption schemes using a natural generalization of correlation-secure trapdoor functions. Kiltz et al. [27] show that the RSA trapdoor permutation is lossy under the Φ-hiding assumption of Cachin et al. [10] . (Concretely, it has log 2 (e) bits of lossiness, where e is the public RSA exponent.) Furthermore, they propose multi-prime hardness assumptions under which RSA has greater lossiness.
In concurrent and independent work, Mol and Yilek [30] propose a lossy trapdoor function based on the modular squaring function. Though this construction is related to ours, its security is based on the seemingly stronger assumption that a random twoprime RSA modulus is indistinguishable from a random three-prime RSA modulus. (See Appendix A for further discussion of this assumption.) In another concurrent and independent work, Hemenway and Ostrovsky [23] generalize the framework of Peikert and Waters [37] to rely on any homomorphic hash proof system, which is an extension of Cramer and Shoup's notion of hash proof systems [13] . Hemenway and Ostrovsky then show that homomorphic hash proof systems can be constructed based on either the quadratic residuosity assumption or the composite residuosity assumption. Their approach is significantly different than ours, and the resulting constructions seem incomparable when considering the trade-off between efficiency and lossiness.
Paper Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we review the definitions of lossy and correlation-secure trapdoor functions. In Sect. 3 we present our construction based on the quadratic residuosity assumption, and in Sect. 4 we generalize this construction to higher-order residues. In Sects. 5, 6, and 7 we present our constructions based on the composite residuosity assumption, the d-Linear assumption, and the hardness of syndrome decoding, respectively.
In Appendix A, we revisit the folklore that relates the distinguishability of 2-prime and 3-prime composites to the quadratic residuosity assumption. In particular, we propose and prove a reasonable instantiation of this folklore.
Preliminaries
We assume familiarity with standard cryptographic objects and notions such as oneway functions, computational indistinguishability, trapdoor permutations, public-key encryption, and chosen-ciphertext security. The reader is referred to [19] for definitions.
Lossy Trapdoor Functions
A collection of lossy trapdoor functions consists of two families of functions. Functions in one family are injective and can be efficiently inverted using a trapdoor. Functions in the other family are "lossy," which means that the size of their image is significantly smaller than the size of their domain. The only security requirement is that a description of a randomly chosen function from the family of injective functions is computationally indistinguishable from a description of a randomly chosen function from the family of lossy functions. Definition 2.1 (Lossy trapdoor functions). Let m : N → N and : N → R be two non-negative functions, and for any n ∈ N, let m = m(n) and = (n). A collection of (m, )-lossy trapdoor functions is a 4-tuple of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms
1. Sampling a lossy function: G 0 (1 n ) outputs a function index σ ∈ {0, 1} * .
Sampling an injective function:
(Here σ is a function index and τ is a trapdoor.) 3. Evaluation: For every function index σ produced by either G 0 or G 1 , the algorithm F(σ, ·) computes a function f σ : {0, 1} m → {0, 1} * with one of the two following properties:
• Lossy: If σ is produced by G 0 , then the image of f σ has size at most 2 m− .
• Injective: If σ is produced by G 1 , then the function f σ is injective.
Inversion of injective functions:
For every pair (σ, τ ) produced by G 1 and every x ∈ {0, 1} m , we have F −1 (τ, F(σ, x)) = x. 5. Security: The two ensembles {σ : σ ← G 0 (1 n )} n∈N and {σ : (σ, τ ) ← G 1 (1 n )} n∈N are computationally indistinguishable.
Note that the size m of the domain (of both types of function) and the size m − of the image of lossy functions depend on the security parameter n. Note also that we do not specify the output of F −1 on inputs not in the image of f σ . In the above definition we have assumed for simplicity that the domain is {0, 1} m . More generally, one may allow the functions to have arbitrary domains D n (this would correspond to D n = {0, 1} m in the definition above). In such a case, one would have to add the requirement that D n 's size is bounded below by 2 m−1 , and that the image of a lossy function is of size at most |D n | · 2 − . (In Definition 2.3 below we generalize the definition so that the domain depends not only on n but also on the function index σ .)
A collection of all-but-one lossy trapdoor functions is a more general primitive. Such a collection is associated with a set B, whose members are referred to as branches. (If B = {0, 1} then we obtain the previous notion of lossy trapdoor functions.) The sampling algorithm of the collection receives an additional parameter b * ∈ B, and outputs a description of a function f (·, ·) together with a trapdoor τ and a set of lossy branches β. The function f has the property that for any branch b ∈ β the function f (b, ·) is injective (and can be inverted using τ ), while the function f (b * , ·) is lossy. Moreover, the description of f hides (in a computational sense) the set of lossy branches β.
Our definition is slightly more general than that of Peikert and Waters [37, Sect. 3.2] , which allows only one lossy branch (i.e., β = {b * }). We allow possibly many lossy branches (other than b * ), and require that given a description of a function and b * it is computationally infeasible to find another lossy branch. The proof of security of the Peikert-Waters CCA-secure public-key encryption scheme [37, Sect. 4.3] can easily be adapted to our more general context. (We are currently not aware of other applications of all-but-one lossy trapdoor functions.) , has only a negligible probability of outputting an element b ∈ β \ {b * } (where the probability is taken over the randomness of B, G, and A).
We now introduce a useful generalization of lossy trapdoor functions which we call lossy trapdoor functions with index-dependent domains. The only difference between these functions and those defined above is that the function's domain is no longer fixed to be {0, 1} m ; instead, it may depend on the function index σ . • Lossy: If σ is produced by G 0 , then the image of f σ has size at most |D σ | · 2 − .
For every pair (σ, τ ) produced by G 1 and every
It is furthermore possible and straightforward to give an analogous generalization of all-but-one lossy trapdoor functions to handle index-dependent domains.
We remark that lossy trapdoor functions with index-dependent domains do not seem to be sufficient to construct correlated-product secure trapdoor functions or CCA-secure public-key encryption. The difficulty is that in the constructions from [37, 39] , a fixed value has to be evaluated on many independently generated instances of the trapdoor function (with respect to the same security parameter). It is therefore crucial that the domain stay the same for all these instances. However, lossy trapdoor functions with index-dependent domains are sufficient for many applications. These include deterministic public-key encryption [5] , "hedged" public-key encryption for protecting against bad randomness [1] , lossy encryption [2] , security against selective opening attacks [2] , and non-interactive string commitments [34] . (In some of these applications the lossy trapdoor function is required to have additional properties.)
A Construction Based on the Quadratic Residuosity Assumption
Our first construction is based on the modular squaring function x → x 2 mod N , where N = P Q for prime numbers P ≡ Q ≡ 3 mod 4 (i.e., Blum integers). This is a 4-to-1 mapping on Z * N , and the construction is obtained by embedding additional information in the output that reduces the number of preimages to either two (these are the lossy functions) or one (these are the injective functions) in a computationally indistinguishable manner. The injective trapdoor functions in our construction can be viewed as a permutation version of the Rabin trapdoor function [38] .
In our initial construction (Sect. 3.1) the functions are defined over an indexdependent domain Z * N and have one bit of lossiness. However, lossy trapdoor functions in a collection are required to share the same domain; i.e., the domain should depend only on the security parameter. Our second construction (Sect. 3.2) overcomes this difficulty with a simple domain extension, which results in lossiness of log 2 (4/3) bits.
We start with a definition. For any odd positive integer N , we denote by JS N : Z → {−1, 0, 1} the Jacobi symbol mod N . We define functions h, j : Z → {0, 1} by
We define h and j on Z N by representing elements of Z N as integers between 0 and N − 1. 
In particular, the four square roots of y take all four values of (h(x), j (x)).

A Lossy Trapdoor Function with Index-Dependent Domains
We define a 5-tuple F = (G 0 , G 1 , S, F, F −1 ) (recall Definition 2.3) as follows. 
5.
Inversion: Given a description of an injective function σ = (N, r, s) together with its trapdoor τ = (P , Q) and y = f N,r,s (x), the algorithm F −1 retrieves x as follows. We now prove that the above construction is indeed lossy based on the quadratic residuosity assumption, which is defined as follows.
, and let Q N be the subgroup of squares in Z * N . We say that the quadratic residuosity assumption holds for N if the two distributions obtained by sampling uniformly at random from Q N or from J N \ Q N are computationally indistinguishable.
Theorem 3.3. Under the quadratic residuosity assumption, F is a collection of (n, 1)-lossy trapdoor functions with index-dependent domains.
Proof. First, it follows from the correctness of the inversion algorithm that G 1 outputs permutations on the set D σ = {1, . . . , N − 1}. Next, we claim that G 0 outputs functions that are 2-to-1 on {1, . . . , N − 1}. Suppose y ∈ Q N . Since s is a quadratic residue, Fact 3.1 implies that for each (η, ι) ∈ {0, 1} 2 there is an x η,ι satisfying
Then for each η ∈ {0, 1} we have f N,r,s (x η,0 ) = y and f N,r,s (x η,1 ) = ry. Thus each element in the set Q N ∪ rQ N has at least two preimages in Z * N , and since this set has cardinality half that of Z * N we deduce that f N,r,s is 2-to-1 on Z * N . A similar argument shows that every square in the ideal P Z N has two preimages in P Z N , and the same for
Descriptions of lossy functions and injective functions differ only in the element s, which is a random element of the subgroup of Z * N with Jacobi symbol 1 that is a quadratic residue in the lossy case and a quadratic non-residue in the injective case. Therefore, the quadratic residuosity assumption implies that lossy functions are computationally indistinguishable from injective functions.
Note that since security does not depend on the distribution of r, the size of the function index σ can be reduced by choosing r to be the smallest positive integer such that JS N (r) = −1.
A Lossy Trapdoor Function
We now show how to extend our previous construction to be defined over a common domain that only depends on the security parameter. We define a 4-tuple F = (G 0 , G 1 , F, F −1 ) (recall Definition 2.1) as follows:
1. Sampling a lossy function is done as in Sect. 3.1, with the difference that now the function f σ is defined on the domain {0, 1} n . 2. Sampling an injective function is done as in Sect. 3.1, with the difference that now the function f σ is defined on the domain {0, 1} n . 3. Evaluation: Given a function index σ = (N, r, s) and x ∈ {0, 1} n , the algorithm F interprets x as an integer in the set {1, . . . , 2 n } and outputs
4. Inversion: Given a description of an injective function σ = (N, r, s) together with its trapdoor τ = (P , Q) and y = f N,r,s (x), the algorithm F −1 retrieves x as follows. If N ≤ y ≤ 2 n , then the algorithm outputs y. Otherwise, it uses the method described in the inversion algorithm from Sect. 3.1.
Theorem 3.4. Under the quadratic residuosity assumption, F is a collection of (n, log 2 (4/3))-lossy trapdoor functions.
Proof. First, it follows from the correctness of the inversion algorithm that G 1 outputs permutations on the set {1, . . . , 2 n }. Next, as already shown in the proof of Theorem 3.3, G 0 outputs functions that are 2-to-1 on the set {1, . . . , N − 1}. Since N is an n-bit modulus (i.e., 2 n−1 < N < 2 n ), the lossy functions are 2-to-1 on at least half of their domain, which implies that their image is of size at most 3/4 · 2 n = 2 n−log 2 (4/3) . Finally, as in the proof of Theorem 3.3, the quadratic residuosity assumption implies that lossy functions are computationally indistinguishable from injective functions.
A Construction Based on the eth Power Residuosity Assumption
In this section we generalize the construction of Sect. 3 to higher-order power residues. Instead of using the squaring function mod N , we use the powering function x → x e mod N , where N is a product of two primes congruent to 1 mod e. This is an e 2 -to-1 mapping on Z * N , and the construction is obtained by embedding additional information in the output that reduces the number of preimages to either e (these are the lossy functions) or 1 (these are the injective functions) in a computationally indistinguishable manner, resulting in log 2 (e) bits of lossiness.
The security of our construction follows from the eth power residuosity assumption, which is a generalization of the standard quadratic residuosity assumption. This assumption, as well as our system, requires us to define the eth power residue symbol, a generalization of the Legendre and Jacobi symbols. We review the basic facts here; for further details see [26, Chap. 14] for the number theory context or [6, 25] for cryptographic applications.
Mathematical Background
Let e ≥ 2 be an integer, and let N = pq be a product of two primes congruent to 1 mod e. We say that x ∈ Z * N is an eth power residue mod N if there is a y ∈ Z * N such that y e ≡ x mod N . Let ζ e ∈ Q be a primitive eth root of unity, let K be the number field Q(ζ e ), and let
We define the eth power residue symbol as follows: For any x ∈ O K and ideal a relatively prime to e, Squirrel [41] gives an algorithm for computing ( x a ) e that runs in time polynomial in log(N (a)), log(N (x)), and e. Boneh and Horwitz [6, 25] give an alternative polynomial-time algorithm for the case where a is principal. Both algorithms use Eisenstein reciprocity [26, p. 207 ], a generalization of quadratic reciprocity.
To define our lossy trapdoor function, we generalize the functions h(x) and j (x) of Sect. 3 to higher residues. These functions will allow us to recover unique preimages of the eth powering map mod N .
When trying to generalize the function j (x), we are immediately confronted with an obstacle: if x is an integer, then ( x N ) e is always 1 when e is odd and is ±1 when e is even, so if e > 2 the symbol does not contain enough information about x. To get around this problem, we find ideals ) e . The following lemma shows that these ideals can be computed easily, given an element μ ∈ Z * N that is a primitive eth root of unity mod p and mod q. Such a μ is said to be a nondegenerate primitive eth root of unity mod N . It is believed that revealing such a μ does not make factoring N any easier. This is clearly the case when e = 2, since the only such μ is −1. (See [6, 9, 25] for other contexts where this assumption is used.) 
and that a i ⊂ p i ∩ q i . Since p i and q i are relatively prime, we have p i ∩ q i = p i q i , and thus a i = p i q i for all i. The decomposition of N in (4.2) now follows from the decompositions of p and q in (4.3), and we have
Note that when e = 2 we have μ = −1, K = Q, and a 1 = N Z.
We now define a function J (x) : Z → Z e that generalizes the function j (x) of Sect. 3. Since the function will depend on our choice of a primitive eth root of unity μ, we make this dependence explicit in the notation. For a fixed μ, let a = N O K + (ζ e − μ)O K be the ideal a 1 from Lemma 4.2, and define
. If a is principal, then a generator can be computed in time polynomial in log N and the discriminant of K = Q(ζ e ) (using e.g. If e = 2, then since μ = −1 the function simply determines whether x mod N is greater than or less than N/2. The fact that J μ and H μ can be used to distinguish preimages of the eth powering map is a consequence of the following proposition, which generalizes Fact 3.1. ) e = 1. To show the same holds for all a i , we note that for each i there is some automorphism σ of K fixing Q such that a i = a σ 1 . Since μ ∈ Z, the result (
Proposition 4.3. Let e be a positive square-free integer and O
) e = 1 now follows from Galoisequivariance of the power residue symbol.
For the "furthermore" statement, let μ be as constructed above, and let α 1 , . . . , α e be integers such that {α i μ j } e i,j =1 is a complete set of solutions to y = x e mod N . Then it is easy to see that for fixed i we have J μ (α i μ j ) = J μ (α i μ j ) for all j, j , and
Suppose that i = i , and let a = pq be the prime factorization of a in O K . Then there are unique k, l ∈ Z e such that α i = α i μ k mod p and α i = α i μ l mod q. We thus have
a ) e then k = l (mod e) and thus α i = α i μ k mod N , which contradicts our assertion that {α i μ j } e i,j =1 is a complete set of solutions to y = x e mod N . We conclude that J μ (α i ) = J μ (α i ) for i = i .
A Lossy Trapdoor Function with Index-Dependent Domains
We assume that the square-free integer e and a primitive eth root of unity ζ e ∈ Q are fixed, and we let K = Q(ζ e ) and O K = Z[ζ e ]. We define a 5-tuple F = (G 0 , G 1 , S, F, F −1 ) (recall Definition 2.3) as follows:
1. Sampling a lossy function: On input 1 n the algorithm G 0 chooses an n-bit modulus N = pq, where p and q are random n/2-bit prime numbers with p, q ≡ 1 We will show that this construction is indeed lossy based on the eth power residuosity assumption. We first state this assumption, and then give the theorem. One can show that the set J N is independent of the choice of ζ e and of μ, given the constraint that μ satisfies the conditions of Proposition 4.3.
The following proposition relates the eth power residuosity assumption as defined above to the two distributions of s ∈ Z N in our lossy and injective sampling algorithms. Proof. To prove the lemma we induct on the number of prime factors of e. To simplify
First, let e be prime and suppose there is an algorithm A such that
Since e is prime, a uniformly random element of J N is in E N with probability 1/e and in H N with probability (e − 1)/e. It follows that
Thus A itself is an algorithm that breaks the eth power residuosity assumption with probability at least e−1 e · ≥ /2, which proves the lemma in this case. (Note that since e is prime, hypothesis (b) holds.)
Now let e 1 , e 2 be coprime square-free integers with k 1 and k 2 prime factors, respectively. We will show that the lemma holds for e 1 and e 2 , then it holds for e = e 1 e 2 . We first set some notation: for i = 1, 2, let E i N be the subgroup of e i th powers in Z * N , and let H i N be the set of elements in J N that are not an f th power mod N for all primes f dividing e i .
Suppose that there is an algorithm A such that (using the notation Γ A (S) defined above) we have
This can be rewritten as
Choose any α, β ∈ (0, 1) such that α + β = 1. Then one of the following two properties holds for A:
Case 2: A can distinguish between random elements of E 1 N ∩ H 2 N and H 1 N ∩ H 2 N with probability at least · β.
We now consider in turn each of the two hypotheses of the theorem. First, suppose hypothesis (a) holds.
• If case 1 holds, then given an element x that is uniform in either E 2 N or H 2 N , running A(x e 1 ) distinguishes these two cases with probability · α = · k 2 /(k 1 + k 2 ). By the inductive hypothesis for e 2 , this implies that there is an algorithm B that can break the eth power residuosity assumption with probability at least · α/2k 2 = /2(k 1 + k 2 ).
• If case 2 holds, then given an element x that is uniform in either E 1 N or H 1 N , the following algorithm distinguishes these two cases with probability
1. Choose a random ∈ [0, e 2 ] coprime to e 2 . 2. Choose a random y ∈ Z * N . 3. Run A(x e 2 · y e 1 e 2 · ρ e 1 ).
(The element y e 1 e 2 · ρ e 1 is a uniformly random element of E 1 N ∩ H 2 N .) By the inductive hypothesis for e 1 , this implies that there is an algorithm B that can break the eth power residuosity assumption with probability at least · β/2k 1 
Since e = e 1 e 2 has k 1 + k 2 prime factors, we conclude that the lemma holds for e = e 1 e 2 . Now suppose hypothesis (b) holds, and furthermore that e 2 is prime (i.e., k 2 = 1). Let α = 1/3 and β = 2/3.
• If case 1 holds, given an element x that is uniform in either E 2 N or H 2 N , running A(x e 1 ) distinguishes these two cases with probability · α. Since e 2 is prime, the base case of the induction implies that there is an algorithm B that can break the eth power residuosity assumption with probability at least · α/2 = /6 ≥ /3 k 1 +1 .
• Suppose case 2 holds. Since e 2 is a prime not dividing e 1 , a uniformly random element of E 1 N is in E 2 N with probability 1/e 2 and in H 2 N with probability (e 2 − 1)/e 2 , and similarly for a random element of H 2 N . It follows that
The hypothesis of case 2 is that
Without loss of generality, we may assume e 2 ≥ 3 and therefore
. It follows from (4.4) and the triangle inequality (in the form |x + y| + |x| ≥ |y|) that one of the following holds:
In case (i), the inductive hypothesis for e 1 implies that there is an algorithm B that breaks the eth power residuosity assumption with probability at least
. In case (ii), the same argument as in case 1 of hypothesis (a) shows that there is an algorithm B that breaks the eth power residuosity assumption with probability at least e 2 /6 · · β/3 k 1 ≥ /3 k+1 .
We conclude that the lemma holds for e = e 1 e 2 .
Note that hypothesis (b) ensures that the factor lost in the security reduction is a polynomial in the security parameter n.
Theorem 4.6. Suppose that one of the hypotheses (a) or (b) of Lemma 4.5 holds. Then under the eth power residuosity assumption, F is a collection of (n, log 2 (e))-lossy trapdoor functions with index-dependent domains.
The proof of Theorem 4.6 is entirely analogous to the proof of Theorem 3.3; we do not repeat the details.
Extending to Large Values of e
Our description of the functions J μ and H μ above suggests that computing these functions always takes time polynomial in e. If this is the case, then the lossy trapdoor function defined above can only be efficiently computed when e is logarithmic in N , and the lossiness is limited to being logarithmic in the security parameter n. However, if e is a product of many small primes, then we can modify the function to achieve lossiness that is a constant fraction of the security parameter n.
Suppose f is a prime dividing e. To compute the eth power residue symbol we use the following "compatibility" identity that holds for any ideal a ⊂ Z[ζ e ] (see Appendix B for a proof):
While the power residue symbol is independent of the choice of ζ e used to compute it, the function J μ depends on this choice. We thus create a system of compatible roots of unity by fixing ζ e and setting ζ f = ζ e/f e for each f | e. If we use J μ (x, r) to denote the function J μ defined above relative to the rth power residue symbol, then the identity (4.5) and our system of compatible roots of unity implies that
It follows that if e is square-free, then we can compute J μ (x, e) by computing J μ (x, f ) for each prime f | e and applying the Chinese remainder theorem.
We cannot use similar techniques to compute the function H μ , but we can define a modified functionĤ μ that has the necessary properties and can be computed via the Chinese remainder theorem. We first let H μ (x, r) denote the function H μ defined relative to the rth power residue symbol, and then definê H μ (x, e) := c ∈ Z e such that for all prime powers f | e, c ≡ H μ (x, f ) mod f .
It is straightforward to show that the result of Proposition 4.3 still holds when we replace H μ withĤ μ .
We can thus carry out the construction of Sect. 4.2, replacing the function H μ witĥ H μ , to obtain lossy trapdoor function with index-dependent domains and log 2 (e) bits of lossiness. When e is a product of many small primes, the lossiness can be a constant fraction of the security parameter n. Note that since e is a publicly known factor of ϕ(N), we require e ≤ N 1/4−ε in order to ensure that Coppersmith's method [12] for finding small roots of a univariate polynomial modulo an unknown divisor of N cannot be used to efficiently factor N .
Note that when e is a product of ω(log n) primes, the reduction under hypothesis (b) of Lemma 4.5 loses a factor that is superpolynomial in the security parameter n. In this case we can obtain a polynomial loss by using hypothesis (a) instead: we have G 0 and G 1 output an additional element ρ in J N that is an f th power non-residue for all primes f dividing e. (If p ≡ q ≡ 3 (mod 4) and e = 2 we can take ρ = −1.) If we include ρ in the function index σ , then the security of our construction reduces to the eth power residuosity assumption where the adversary is given ρ in addition to N and μ.
Alternatively, one could simply assume that E N and H N are indistinguishable; we have no evidence that this assumption is any easier to break than the eth power residuosity assumption as defined in Definition 4.4. Indeed, we chose our definition primarily to be consistent with prior works in the literature.
Lossy Trapdoor Functions
We can apply the technique of Sect. 3.2 to define functions with domain {1, . . . , 2 n }, i.e., depending only on the security parameter. The same analysis as in the case e = 2 shows that we obtain log 2 (2e/(e + 1)) bits of lossiness, which is never greater than 1 even for large e.
We can do better by fixing some m and defining the functions over {1, . . . , 2 n+m }. We apply the modified powering function x → x e · r J μ (x) · s H μ (x) mod N to each copy of Z N in this domain, i.e., to the sets {aN +1, . . . , (a +1)N −1} for a = 0, . . . , 2 n+m /N −1. For the remainder of the domain we let the function be the identity. It is easy to see that for sufficiently large m these functions are e-to-1 on almost all of the domain, so we can obtain almost log 2 (e) bits of lossiness. (In fact, one can show that if m ≥ log 2 (e) − 1, then we obtain a collection of (n, log 2 (e) − e · 2 −m )-lossy trapdoor functions.)
A Construction Based on the Composite Residuosity Assumption
Our construction is based on the Damgård-Jurik encryption scheme [14] with additional insights by Damgård and Nielsen [15, 16] . We begin with a brief description of the Damgård-Jurik scheme, and then present our constructions of lossy trapdoor functions and all-but-one lossy trapdoor functions.
The Damgård-Jurik Encryption Scheme
Damgård and Jurik [14] proposed an encryption scheme based on computations in the group Z N s+1 , where N = P Q is an RSA modulus and s ≥ 1 is an integer (it contains Paillier's encryption scheme [35] as a special case by setting s = 1). Consider a modulus N = P Q where P and Q are odd primes and gcd(N, φ(N )) = 1 (when P and Q are sufficiently large and randomly chosen, this will be satisfied except with negligible probability). We call such a modulus N admissible in the following discussion. For such an N , the multiplicative group Z * N s+1 is a direct product G × H , where G is cyclic of order N s and H is isomorphic to Z * N .
Theorem 5.1 [14] . For any admissible N and s < min{P , Q}, the map ψ s :
is an isomorphism of abelian groups. In particular, we have
Given λ(N ) = lcm(P − 1, Q − 1), there is a polynomial-time algorithm that inverts the function ψ s .
The following describes the Damgård-Jurik encryption scheme:
• Key generation: On input 1 n choose an admissible n-bit modulus N = P Q. The public key is (N, s) and the secret key is λ = lcm(P − 1, Q − 1).
• Encryption: Given a message m ∈ Z N s and the public key (N, s) , choose a random r ∈ Z * N and output E(m) = (1 + N) m r N s mod N s+1 .
• Decryption: Given a ciphertext c ∈ Z N s+1 and the secret key λ, apply the inversion algorithm of Theorem 5.1 to compute ψ −1 s (c) = (m, r) and output m. The semantic security of the scheme (for any s ≥ 1) is based on the decisional composite residuosity assumption: namely, that any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that receives as input an n-bit RSA modulus N cannot distinguish a random element in Z * N 2 from a random N th power in Z * N 2 with probability a non-negligible function of n. We refer the reader to [14] for a more formal statement of the decisional composite residuosity assumption and for the proof of security.
A Lossy Trapdoor Function with Index-Dependent Domains
Each function in our construction is described by a pair (N, c) , where N is an n-bit modulus as above, and c ∈ Z N s+1 . For the injective functions c is a random Damgård-Jurik encryption of 1, and for the lossy functions c is a random encryption of 0. The semantic security of the encryption scheme guarantees that the two collections of functions are computationally indistinguishable. In order to evaluate a function f (N,c) 
For an injective function f (N,c) it holds that f (N,c) (x, y) is an encryption of x (where the randomness of this ciphertext depends on x and y), and using the secret key it is possible to retrieve both x and y . For a lossy function f (N,c) it holds that f (N,c) (x, y) is an encryption of 0, and in this case most of the information in the input is lost.
Given any polynomial s = s(n) we define a 5-tuple Proof. Theorem 5.1 guarantees that the injective functions can be efficiently inverted using their trapdoor information. The semantic security of the Damgård-Jurik encryption scheme guarantees that the descriptions of injective and lossy functions are computationally indistinguishable. Thus it only remains to give an upper bound for the size of the lossy functions' images. Let (N, c) be a function index for a lossy function, where c = r N s mod N s+1 for some r ∈ Z * N . We have
Using the isomorphism ψ s described in Theorem 5.1 we can bound the size of the function's image as follows:
Therefore the amount of lossiness is at least
The above construction can easily be extended to a collection of all-but-one lossy trapdoor functions. We describe the extension here; the proof of security is essentially identical to the proof of Theorem 5.4 and is therefore omitted.
Given an integer s ≥ 1 we define a 4-tuple F ABO s = (B, G, F, F −1 ) (recall Definition 2.2, and here we consider only one lossy branch as defined in [37] 
Theorem 5.3. Under the decisional composite residuosity assumption, for any polynomial s = s(n) it holds that F ABO
s is a collection of ((n − 1)(s + 1), (n − 1)s − 1)-allbut-one lossy trapdoor functions with index-dependent domains.
A Lossy Trapdoor Function
We now extend the above construction to a lossy trapdoor function. In order to guarantee that all the functions in the collection share the same domain, we define the functions over the domain {0, 1} (n−1)s × {0, 1} n/2−1 . That is, the domain is {0, 1} m , for m = m(n) = (n − 1)s + n/2 − 1. We observe that: (a) the fact that N is an n-bit modulus implies that any x ∈ {0, 1} (n−1)s can be interpreted as an element of Z N s since 2 (n−1)s < N; and (b) the fact that P and Q are n/2-bit prime numbers implies that if y ∈ {0, 1} n/2−1 is interpreted as an integer between 1 and 2 n/2−1 , then y ∈ Z * N (since 2 n/2−1 < min{P , Q} and thus gcd(N, y) = 1).
Given any polynomial s = s(n) we define a 4-tuple function (N, c), a trapdoor  (λ, r) , and an element z ∈ Z N s+1 , the algorithm F −1 invokes the inversion algorithm provided by Theorem 5.1 to compute ψ −1 s (z) = (x, r x y), and then recovers x and y. Theorem 5.4. Under the composite residuosity assumption, for any polynomial s = s(n) it holds that F s is a collection of ((n − 1)s + n/2 − 1, (n − 1)s − n/2 − 1)-lossy trapdoor functions.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 5.2, we can express the image of the function as follows:
Given an integer s ≥ 1 we define a 4-tuple F ABO s = (B, G, F, F −1 ) (recall Definition 2.2, and here we consider only one lossy branch as defined in [37] ) as follows: 
A Construction Based on the d-Linear Assumption
The d-Linear assumption [24, 40] is a generalization of the decision Diffie-Hellman assumption that may hold even in groups with an efficiently computable d-linear map. The 1-Linear assumption is DDH, while the 2-Linear assumption is also known as the Decision Linear assumption [7] . The assumption is as follows: Definition 6.1. Let d ≥ 1 be an integer, and let G be a finite cyclic group of order q. We say the d-Linear assumption holds in G if the distributions
are computationally indistinguishable. Peikert and Waters [37, Sect. 5] give lossy and all-but-one lossy trapdoor functions based on the DDH assumption. In the Peikert-Waters construction, the function index is an ElGamal encryption of an n × n matrix M which is either the zero matrix (lossy mode) or the identity matrix (injective mode) using a finite cyclic group G of order p. The DDH assumption in G implies that these two encryptions cannot be distinguished. The construction can be generalized to d-linear assumptions using generalized ElGamal encryption, but such schemes are less efficient since ElGamal based on the d-Linear assumption produces d + 1 group elements per ciphertext (see e.g. [40] ).
Our construction is based on the following basic observation from linear algebra: if M is an n × n matrix over a finite field F p and x is a length-n column vector, then the map f M : x → M x has image of size p Rk(M) , where Rk(M) is the rank of M. If we restrict the domain to only binary vectors (i.e., those with entries in {0, 1}), then the function f M is injective when Rk(M) = n, and its inverse can be computed by f
If on the other hand we have Rk(M) < n/ log 2 (p), then f M is not injective even when the domain is restricted to binary vectors, since the image is contained in a subgroup of size less than 2 n . By performing the above linear algebra "in the exponent" of a group of order p, we can create lossy trapdoor functions based on DDH and the related d-Linear assumptions. In particular, for any n the size of the function index is the same for all d.
We will use the following notation: we let F p denote a field of p elements and Rk d (F n×n p ) the set of n × n matrices over F p of rank d. If we have a group G of order p, an element g ∈ G, and a vector x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ F n p , then we define g x to be the column vector (g x 1 , . . . , g x n ) ∈ G n . If M = (a ij ) is an n × n matrix over F p , we denote by g M the n × n matrix over G given by (g a ij ) . Given a matrix M = (a ij ) ∈ F n×n p and a column vector g = (g 1 , . . . , g n ) ∈ G n , we define g M by
Similarly, given a matrix S = (g ij ) ∈ G n×n and a column vector x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ F n p , we define S x by
With these definitions, we have
The Construction. For any positive integer d and any real number ∈ (0, 1), we define a 4-tuple F = (G 0 , G 1 , F, F −1 ) (recall Definition 2.1) as follows:
1. Sampling a lossy function: On input 1 n , the algorithm G 0 chooses at random a n/d -bit prime p, a group G of order p, and a generator g of G. Proof. We first note that in the lossy case, when M is of rank d, the image of f S is contained in a subgroup of G n of size p d < 2 n . The condition n > d guarantees p ≥ 3, so when M is of rank n the function f S is in fact injective. It is straightforward to verify that the inversion algorithm performs correctly for injective functions. Finally, by [31, Lemma A.1] , the d-Linear assumption implies that the matrix S when M is of rank n is computationally indistinguishable from the matrix S when M is of rank d.
Note that the system's security scales with the bit size of p, i.e., as n/d. In addition, note that the discrete logarithms in the inversion step can be performed efficiently when x is a binary vector. (Here we take advantage of the fact that the output of F −1 is unspecified on inputs not in the image of F.)
We now describe the extension of the system to all-but-one lossy trapdoor functions, in the case where the parameter d in the above construction is equal to 1. Let I n denote the n × n identity matrix. For any real number ∈ (0, 1), we define a 4-tuple F = (G 0 , G 1 , F, F −1 ) (recall Definition 2.2) as follows:
1. Sampling a branch: On input 1 n , the algorithm B outputs a uniformly distributed b ∈ {1, . . . , 2 n }.
Sampling a function:
On input 1 n and a lossy branch b * , the algorithm G chooses at random a n -bit prime p, a group G of order p, and a generator g of G. = (g, M) , a branch b, and a vector g ∈ G n , we define F −1 (τ, b, g) as follows:
Theorem 6.3. Suppose n > 1. If the DDH assumption holds for G, then the above family is a collection of (n, (1 − )n)-all-but-one lossy trapdoor functions.
Proof. We first observe that if A is the rank 1 matrix computed by
We now verify each property of Definition 2.2. Properties (1) and (2) are immediate.
To verify property (3) for lossy functions, note that (6.2) implies that f S,b * ( x) = g A x .
Since A has rank 1, the image of f S,b * is contained in a subgroup of G n of size p < 2 n . To check property ( It is straightforward to verify that the inversion algorithm performs correctly whenever b / ∈ β, so property (4) holds.
Properties (5) and (6) follow from the DDH assumption for G. We show property (5) by constructing a sequence of games: Since the Game 3 challenge is independent of ω, the advantage of any adversary playing Game 3 is zero. We now show that if the DDH assumption holds for G, then for i = 0, 1, 2, no polynomial-time adversary A can distinguish Game i from Game i+1 with non-negligible advantage. Finally, to demonstrate property (6) we show that any adversary A that produces an element of β given S and b * can be used to compute discrete logarithms in G, contradicting the DDH assumption. Choose a matrix A R ← Rk 1 (F n×n p ), and let A (X) be the n × n matrix over F p [X] that is the matrix A with the first row multiplied by X. For any value X = t = 0, the matrix A (t) is uniformly distributed in Rk 1 (F n×n p ). Let (g, g t ) be a discrete logarithm challenge for G. Since a 11 = 0 with probability 1/p, we can solve for t with all but negligible probability.
If we choose any integer d ≥ 2 and repeat the above construction with p a n/dbit prime and A a rank d matrix, then we expect to obtain an all-but-one lossy trapdoor function under the d-Linear assumption. Indeed, the proofs of properties (1)-(6) carry through in a straightforward way. However, the above proof of property (7) does not seem to generalize. In particular, the generalization of (6.3) is the equation det(A (t) − λI n ) = 0, which can be written as ut + v = 0 for some (known) u, v ∈ F p . When d = 1 the element u = a 11 is independent of λ, so we can conclude that it is nonzero with high probability; however, when d ≥ 2 this is not necessarily the case. We thus leave as an open problem the completion of the proof for d ≥ 2.
Correlated Input Security from Syndrome Decoding
Correlation-Secure Trapdoor Functions
A collection of efficiently computable functions is a pair of algorithms F = (G, F) , where G is a key-generation algorithm used for sampling a description of a function, and F is an evaluation algorithm used for evaluating a function on a given input. The following definition formalizes the notion of a k-wise product, which is a collection F k consisting of all k-tuples of functions from F . Definition 7.1 (k-wise product). Let F = (G, F) be a collection of efficiently computable functions. For any integer k, we define the k-wise product F k = (G k , F k ) as follows:
• The key-generation algorithm G k on input 1 n invokes k independent instances of G (1 n ) and outputs (σ 1 , . . . , σ k ) . That is, a function is sampled from F k by independently sampling k functions from F .
A one-way function is a function that is efficiently computable but is hard to invert given the image of a uniformly chosen input. This notion extends naturally to onewayness under any specified input distribution, not necessarily the uniform distribution. Specifically, we say that a function is one-way with respect to an input distribution I if it is efficiently computable but hard to invert given the image of a random input sampled according to I. More formally: Definition 7.2 (One-way functions). Let F = (G, F) be a collection of efficiently computable functions with domain {D n } n∈N , and let I be a distribution where I(1 n ) is distributed over D n . We say that F is one-way with respect to the input distribution I if for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A and polynomial p(·), it holds that
for all sufficiently large n, where σ ← G(1 n ) and x ← I(1 n ).
In the context of k-wise products, a straightforward argument shows that for any collection F which is one-way with respect to some input distribution I, the k-wise product F k is one-way with respect to the input distribution that samples k independent inputs from I. The following definition formalizes the notion of one-wayness under correlated inputs, where the inputs for F k may be correlated. Definition 7.3 (One-wayness under correlated inputs). Let F = (G, F) be a collection of efficiently computable functions with domain {D n } n∈N , and let C be a distribution where
the Cartesian product of D n with itself k times) for some integer k = k(n). We say that F is one-way under C-correlated inputs if F k is one-way with respect to the input distribution C.
For the special case that distribution C is the uniform k-repetition distribution (i.e., C samples a uniformly random input x ∈ D n and outputs k copies of x), we say that F is one-way under k-correlated inputs. Rosen and Segev [39, Theorem 3.3] show that a collection of (m, )-lossy trapdoor functions can be used to construct a collection F that is one-way under k-correlated inputs for any k < m−ω(log m) m− .
The Construction
Our construction is based on Niederreiter's coding-based encryption system [33] which itself is the dual of the McEliece encryption system [29] . Let 0 < ρ = ρ(n) < 1 and 0 < δ = δ(n) < 1/2 be two functions in the security parameter n. We set the domain D n,δ to be the set of all n-bit strings with Hamming weight δn. Note that D n,δ is efficiently samplable (see e.g. [18] ). The Niederreiter trapdoor function F = (G, F, F −1 ) is defined as follows.
• Key generation: On input 1 n the algorithm G chooses at random a non-singular binary ρn × ρn matrix S, an (n, n − ρn, δn)-linear binary Goppa code capable of correcting up to δn errors (given by its ρn × n binary parity check matrix G), 4 and an n × n permutation matrix P . It sets H := SGP , which is a binary ρn × n matrix. The function index is σ = H , the trapdoor is τ = (S, G, P ).
• Evaluation: Given a function index H and x ∈ {0, 1} n with Hamming weight δn, the algorithm F computes the function f H (x) = H x ∈ {0, 1} ρn .
• Inversion: Given a trapdoor (S, G, P ) and y = H x, the algorithm F −1 computes S −1 y = GP x, applies a syndrome decoding algorithm for G to recoverŷ = P x, and computes x = P −1ŷ .
The Niederreiter trapdoor function can be proved one-way under the indistinguishability and syndrome decoding assumptions, which are indexed by the parameters 0 < ρ < 1 and 0 < δ < 1/2.
Indistinguishability assumption. The binary ρn × n matrix H output by G(1 n ) is computationally indistinguishable from a uniform matrix of the same dimensions. Syndrome decoding assumption. The collection of functions which is defined as f U (x) := Ux for a uniform ρn × n binary matrix U is one-way on the domain D n,δ .
Choosing the weight δ to be close to the Gilbert-Warshamov bound is commonly believed to give hard instances of the syndrome decoding problem (see e.g., [18] ). The Gilbert-Warshamov bound for an (n, k, δn)-linear code with δ < 1/2 is given by the
It is therefore assumed that the syndrome decoding assumption holds for all 0 < δ < 1/2 satisfying h 2 (δ) < ρ [18] . Note that one-wayness also implies that the cardinality of D n,δ is super-polynomial in n. The following theorem was proved in [18] . This theorem implies that the Niederreiter trapdoor function is one-way under kcorrelated inputs. Proof. Fix a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A that plays the security game for one-wayness under k-correlated inputs. Define ε = Pr A H 1 , . . . , H k , H 1 (x) (x) , . . . , U k (x) = x ∈ negl(n).
Forρ := ρk, define theρn × n matrix U by concatenating the columns of the matrices U i . Then the distributions (U 1 , . . . , U k , U 1 (x), . . . , U k (x)) and (U, U x) are identical. Since h 2 (δ) ≤ ρ/k =ρ we can apply Theorem 7.4 to obtain Pr A(U, U x) = x − Pr A(U, uρ n ) = x ∈ negl(n), where uρ n is a uniform bit string in {0, 1}ρ n . Observing that Pr[A(U, uρ n ) = x] = 1/|D n,δ | ∈ negl(n) (since x ∈ D n,δ is independent of A's view) implies that ε is negligible.
We remark that the above proof implies that the Niederreiter trapdoor function has linearly many hard-core bits, which greatly improves efficiency of the CCA-secure encryption scheme obtained by using the construction from [39] .
Appendix A. A Note on the Relationship Between the 2vs3Primes and QR Assumptions
Folklore dating to the 1980s (see, e.g., [4] ) asserts that if it is hard to distinguish 2-prime composites from 3-prime composites, then it is hard to distinguish quadratic residues from quadratic non-residues (modulo a composite). As is often the case with folklore, it is not clear what exactly is meant by this assertion. Specifically, the folklore observation is that a quadratic residuosity oracle allows one to distinguish a 2-prime composites N from 3-prime composites N (by sampling random integers modulo N and counting the fraction of quadratic residues modulo N ), but this observation presumes that the quadratic residuosity oracle works well for both 2-prime and 3-prime composites. 5 Note, however, that the existence of such an oracle does not follow from the negation of the standard quadratic residuosity assumption, which only refers to 2-prime composites. Indeed, the (standard) quadratic residuosity assumption asserts that for random 2-prime composites N = P Q such that | log 2 P − log 2 Q| ≤ 1 (and P ≡ Q ≡ 3 (mod 4)) it is infeasible to distinguish random quadratic residues modulo N from random quadratic non-residues modulo N that have Jacobi symbol 1, where in both cases the potential distinguisher is also given the composite N . The negation of this assumption is that a corresponding distinguisher does exist, but it is unclear how such a distinguisher behaves when given pairs (x, N ) when N is a 3-prime composite. Let Gen 2 (·) be a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that on input 1 n samples two n/2-bit prime numbers P and Q from some distribution D 2 such that N = P Q is an n-bit number, and outputs N . Similarly, let Gen 3 (·) be a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that on input 1 n samples three n/3-bit prime numbers P , Q, and R from some distribution D 3 such that N = P QR is an n-bit number, and outputs N . In both cases the primes may be subject to additional constraints, in the form of congruence relations. For example, for most applications the algorithm Gen 2 (·) is required to choose P and Q such that P ≡ Q ≡ 3 mod 4 (i.e., Blum integers).
For any odd positive integer N we denote by JS N : Z → {−1, 0, 1} the Jacobi symbol modulo N . We define J N = {x ∈ Z * N : JS N (x) = 1} and Q N = {x 2 : x ∈ Z * N }. Using this notation, the quadratic residuosity (QR) assumption asserts that, for N generated by Gen 2 (·), the uniform distribution over Q N is computationally indistinguishable from the uniform distribution over J N \ Q N . (In both cases, the sample of Z N is accompanied by N itself.) As for the 2vs3Primes assumption, it asserts that the output distributions of Gen 2 (·) and Gen 3 (·) are computationally indistinguishable.
In what follows we prove that under a reasonable restriction on the primes that are sampled by Gen 2 (·) and Gen 3 (·), the 2vs3Primes assumption implies the QR assumption. The restriction that we require is that given an integer N that is the output of either Gen 2 (·) or Gen 3 (·), it is possible to efficiently sample from the uniform distribution over the set J N \ Q N . That is, we need to be able to efficiently produce a uniformly distributed element that has Jacobi symbol 1 (modulo N ), and is not a square modulo N . We denote this restriction by (R1), and we demonstrate below that it is implied by enforcing simple congruence relations on the primes that compose N .
• If β 2 (n) − β 3 (n) is non-negligible, then let A be the algorithm that on input N samples x ← Q N , and invokes A(x, N ). Such an x can be sampled by sampling a uniform x ∈ Z * N and outputting x 2 mod N .
• If γ 2 (n) − γ 3 (n) is non-negligible, then let A be the algorithm that on input N samples x ← J N \ Q N , and invokes A(x, N ). Such an x can be sampled due to restriction (R1).
We conclude by presenting a second restriction (R2) that is easy to satisfy and implies restriction (R1). As pointed out in the proof of Claim A.1, the quotient group J N /Q N consists of two cosets for N = P Q and of four cosets for N = P QR. More specifically, for N = P Q it holds that J N /Q N = {Q N , Q N · e} for any e ∈ J N \ Q N . In addition, for N = P QR it holds that J N /Q N = {Q N , Q N · e 1 , Q N · e 2 , Q N · e 3 } for any e 1 , e 2 , e 3 ∈ J N such that e 1 is a square modulo P and not modulo Q or R, e 2 is a square modulo Q and not modulo P or R, and e 3 is a square modulo R and not modulo P or Q.
In restriction (R2) we require that there exist three fixed elements e 1 , e 2 , e 3 ∈ Z N such that for N = P Q it holds that e 1 , e 2 , e 3 ∈ J N \ Q N , and for N = P QR it holds that J N /Q N = {Q N , Q N · e 1 , Q N · e 2 , Q N · e 3 }. Given this restriction, the algorithm that samples x uniformly in Z * N and e uniformly in {e 1 , e 2 , e 3 }, and outputs x 2 · e mod N , produces, in both cases, a uniformly distributed element in the set J N \ Q N .
Using the fact that for any odd prime P = 3, it holds that we see that restriction (R2) is satisfied with e 1 = −1, e 2 = 2, and e 3 = −3, provided that Gen 2 (·) chooses P and Q such that P ≡ Q ≡ 11 mod 24, and that Gen 3 (·) chooses P , Q and R such that P ≡ 5 mod 24, Q ≡ 23 mod 24, and R ≡ 19 mod 24.
Note that these congruence restrictions may make the problem of distinguishing 2-prime composites from 3-primes composites easier than in the general case. In particular, the distinguishing task given the above choice of e i would be extremely easy if it were the case that 11 · 11 ≡ 5 · 19 · 23 mod 24, but "luckily" this is not the case. 6 For larger values of e i there are in fact choices of congruences for P , Q in Gen 2 (·) and P , Q, R in Gen 3 (·) such that the e i always have the desired Jacobi symbols, but N mod e 1 e 2 e 3 is different in the 2-primes case and the 3-primes case.
